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LAW SERIES 29, MISSOURI BULLETIN
THE DOMICILE OF A MARRIED WOMAN
Originally the rule was that the domicile of a married wom-
an was that of her husband.' It made no difference what the
actual facts were, a wife would not be heard to say that she had
a separate domicile. This notion was largely due to the law's
conception of a married couple as one person, which idea was
1. Warrender v. Warrender (1835) 2 Cl. & Fin. 488, 6 Eng. Rep. 1239;
Yelverton v. Yelverton (1859) 1 Sw., & Tr. 574, 164 Eng. Rep. 866;
Armytage v. Armytage (1898) P. 178; Ogden v. Ogden (1908) 1 P.
46; Harrison v. Harrison (1852) 20 Ala. 629 (dictum); Kashaw v.
Kashaw (1853) 3 Cal. 312; Dougherty v. Snyder (1826) 15 S. &. R.
(Pa.) 84 (dictum); Nichols v. Nichols (1899) 92 Fed. 1; "Though
a wife may acquire a home for herself, she can under no circum-
stances have any other domicile or legal home than that of her hus-
band." Dicey, Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed. 137. See also Greene v.
Greene (1831) 11 Pick. (Mass.) 409. In McPherson's Administrator
v. McPherson (1897) 70 Mo. App. 330, a man domiciled in New
York married a woman domiciled at the time of the marriage in
Missouri. After the marriage the husband returned to New York,
his wife intending to follow him as soon as her affairs would per-
mit. Prior to his wife's going to New York, and while she still
remained in Missouri, she died. It was held that the wife was domi-
ciled in New York from the moment of her marriage, even though
she had never been there to acquire settlement, the court saying
(70 Mo. App. 1. c. 335): "By his intermarriage his wife eo instanti
acquired the same domicile. The fact that she-died-before her
actual removal to New York in nowise affected the question of her
legal domicile in that state from the time of the consummation of her
marriage with one of its resident citizens." While it is true that the
authorities will permit a person to retain a domicile while absent,
after a settlement has been actually made with the appropriate in-
tent (Reed's Will (1906) 48 Ore. 500, 87 Pac. 763; Dupuy v. Wurtz
(1873) 53 N. Y. 556) it is usually said that a domicile cannot
be acquired as a result of a mere intention to go to a place in the
future and acquire a home. The decision therefore in McPherson's
case must proceed on the theory that a husband and wife are one,
and the wife for that reason domiciled with her husband. See also
Wicked Estate (1900) 128 Cal. 270, 60 Pac. 867 and Bank v. Mitchell
(1860) 28 N. J. L., 516 where the courts of necessity also based their
decisions on the fiction.
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based on a wife's duty to be with her husband, he in turn being
bound to support her.'
Usually, the American cases say that a person gains a domi-
cile if he goes to a country with no intention of settling elsewhere
-if he proposes to stay there indefinitely.3 There is no mystery
connected with the act of acquiring or retaining a domicile; it
is a mere question whether or not these acts have been accom-
plished, and if it be found that a settlement has been made with
the appropriate intention, a domicile has been secured. Gaining
and maintaining a domicile is effected through the exercise of
these human powers coupled with an existing state of mind. Un-
doubtedly most wives are domiciled with their husbands,' but
now and then parties are separated, and a wife is found, right-
fully or wrongfully, away from her husband, settled in a juris-
diction where she intends to remain, having no intention of going
elsewhere at any definite time. Are we warranted, when such are
the facts and in the face of the rule last stated, in holding that a
wife has not gained a domicile in such a place? Can we state
as a general proposition that she is unable to have a legal home
apart from her husband with the customary domiciliary rights
and privileges, regardless of where he is, or what he may be do-
2. "The law commits the power (i. e. to select a domicile) to the one
on whom it casts the burden of supporting the family, and makes
the husband's domicile the wife's." Bishop, Marriage, Divorce, and
Separation, sec. 1714.
3. Putnam v. Johnson (1813) 10 Mass. 488; Appeal of Hindman (1877)
85 Pa. 466. The rule in England is stricter, and requires an inten-
tion to remain in the place of settlement for all time; Winans v.
Attorney General (1904) App. Cas. 287. Such a rule is not suited
to methods of living in this country; this definition (i. e. of domi-
cile, is too limited to apply to the migratory habits of the people
of this country," Appeal of Hindman, supra, 85 Pa. 1. c. 486.
4. In the absence of any proof to the contrary, a wife naturally should
be regarded as domiciled with her husband. See State ex rel.
v. Wurdeman (1907) 129 Mo. App. 263, 108 S. W. 144; Baldwin v.
Flagg (1881) 43 N. J. L. 495; Re N. Y. etc. Co. (1913) 139 N. Y.
Supp. 695; Howland v. Granger (1900) 22 R. I. 1, 45 At. 740.
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ing? In answering this question, in later times, the courts have
modified the orthodox principle to some extent, and it is in-
tended to consider the changes that have thus occurred in this
branch of the law.
I
If a wife, because of her husband's wrongful conduct, is
under no duty to remain with him, there should be no objec-
tion to her establishing her own independent domicile. She has
the power to do so and its exercise apparently conflicts with no
justifiable public policy. A decision to the contrary must be
based on.the fiction of unity of person and involves its applica-
tion to a state of facts to which it should not be applied. The
better authority, therefore, holds that she may acquire a domi-
cile for all purposes under these conditions.5  The question of
a wife's capacity to secure her own domicile, her husband hav-
ing abandoned or deserted her, has usually been presented to the
courts in her action for a divorce. There is considerable au-
thority to the effect that such an injured wife can gain an in-
dependent domicile to divorce her husband,6 but sometimes it is
5. Gordon v. Yost (1905) 140 Fed. 79; Town v. Greaves (1901) 112 Fed.
183; Wilcox v. Nixon (1905) 115 La. Ann. 47; 38 So. 890; Mc-
Pherson v. Housel (1860) 13 N. J. Eq. 35; Shute v. Sargent (1892)
67 N. H. 305, 36 Atl. 282; Commissioners v. Patterson (1918) 169
N. Y. Supp. 316; McKay v. McKay (1915) 192 Mo. App. 221, 182 S.
W. 124. See also Ditson v. Ditson (1856) 4 R. I. 87, Wacker v.
Wacker (1913) 139 N. Y. Supp. 78 (a curious decision). But see
contra Nichols v. Nichols (1899) '92 Fed. 1; Harrison v. Harrison
(1852) 20 Ala. 629 (dictum). In Wickes' Estate (1900) 128 Cal. 270
60 Pac. 867 a husband had an incurable disease and was placed in
a hospital to remain there. The wife went elsewhere and establish-
ed herself to remain indefinitely apart from her husband. It was
held, contrary to her desire and intent, that she was domiciled with
her husband. See further cases cited supra, note 1.
6. State ex rel. v. Davis (1918) 199 Mo. App. 439, 203 S. W. 654;
Wyrick v. Wyrick (1912) 162 Mo. App. 723, 145 S. W. 144 (dictum);
Harding v. Alden (1832) 9 Greenl. (Me.) 140; Clark v. Clark (1906)
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intimated that her power to secure one is limited to acquiring it
for divorcing her husband.7  Under this rule for all purposes
other than procuring a divorce, a wife is regarded as being domi-
ciled with her husband. A few cases hold that a new domicile
may not be secured even to divorce a defaulting husband. This
line of decisions probably would not go so far as to compel a
wife to follow her husband into other countries to procure a
divorce; she would be allowed to bring such an action at the
last matrimonial domicile. Such domicile would be regarded as
hers (apart from her husband) for this one purpose, but aside
from this exception it is stated in these cases that a wife is still
domiciled with her husband, wherever he may be, even though
191 Mass. 129, 77 N. E. 702; Hunt v. Hnt (1878) 72 N. Y. 217;
Payson v. Payson (1857) 34 N. H. 518; Miller v. Miller (1913) 67
Ore. 359, 136 Pac. 15; Ditson v. Ditson, supra, note 5. See also
Humphrey v. Humphrey (1905) 115 Mo. App. 361, 91 S. W. 405;
Chapman v. Chapman (1889) 129 Ill. 386; Shaw v. Shaw (1867) 98
Mass. 158. But see contra Johnson v. Johnson (1877) 75 Ky. 485,
and cases cited supra, note 1.
There are some cases holding that when a husband abandons his
wife, she may, for purposes of divorce at least, elect whether she
will regard herself as domiciled either with him, or at the place
where she is actually settled. See Ensign v. Ensign (1907) 105 N. Y.
Supp. 917; Masten v. Masten (1844) 15 N. H. 159; Duxstad v. Dux-
stad (1909) 17 Wyo. 411, 100 Pac. 112. But see contra Wacker v.
Wacker (1913) 139 N. Y. Supp. 78. See also Ashbaugh v. Ashbaugh
(1856) 17 Il. 476. The reason for affording the election is mani-
festly to protect a deserted wife and make jurisdiction in the case
of such a divorce sure.
7. Some cases seem to intimate that the separate domicile may be taken
only to secure a divorce. See State ex rel v. Davis, Wyrick v.
Wyrick, and Miller v. Miller, supra, note 6 where although it was
not necessary to the decisions, the courts state that the domicile is
for divorce purposes alone. Compare, however, Cheever v. Wilson
(1869) 9 Wall. (U. S.) 108, 19 L. Ed. 604 where the court said
(p. 124), "The rule is that she (the wife) may acquire a separate
domicile whenever it is necessary and proper that she should do so."
The action was one for divorce.
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she does not know his whereabouts, and may be unable to ascer-
tain this fact.8
The rule that a wife, who is free to leave her husband, is un-
able to secure a separate domicile except to procure a divorce,
and that still more rigid rule that she can be domiciled away
from him only in the last matrimonial domicile, and there mere-
ly to bring a divorce action do not seem to be desirable. They deny
to a married woman, who in substance has been deserted, all
right to independent domiciliary privileges unless she frees her
husband from the matrimonial bonds. In other words, the law
is willing to sell to her the legal ability (she has, as already noted,
the physical capacity) to acquire her own domicile if she will
pay by giving up what is left of the matrimonial relation. Yet
she is not bound to be with her husband, and ordinarily the de-
cision as to whether or not there should be a divorce would rest
with her, the innocent party. The price asked for the power is
too dear, nor is any real necessity for demanding it perceived.9
If the last mentioned rules served to protect the marriage
8. Hick v. Hick (1869) 68 Ky. 670; Johnson v. Johnson, supra, note 6.
Harteau v. Harteau (1833) 14 Pick. (Mass.) 181 (but see Clark v.
Clark, supra, note 6) ; Armytage v. Armytage (1898) P. 178; Ogden
v. Ogden (1908) 1 P. 46. There is no authoritative ruling in England
to the effect that the wife may retain her domicile in the last place
where the parties lived together "or the purpose of divorce, but there
is dictum to this effect. See especially Armytage's case, supra. It was
proposed by statute in 1921 to give jurisdiction for divorce in favor
of a wife at the last matrimonial domicile in cases where the wife
was deserted, but apparently this provision has not as yet been en-
acted. See Dicey, op. cit. 836.
9. "We should hesitate long before deciding that the only exception to
the rule that the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband
is in judicial proceedings whose express object is to show that the
relation itself ought to be dissolved . . . since there is grave
danger that serious injustice might arise." Town v. Greaves, supra,
note 5, 112 Fed. 1. c. 188. In the same case the court said (p. 187)
"The wife may not desire a divorce . . she may be ready to
condone the fault of the husband . . . she may desire to avoid
publicity; or she may die before she has established her rights (i. e.
to a separate domicile) by a judicial decree."
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status, or to prevent encroachment upon a husband's rights at a
domicile other than his own (and perhaps, in effect at least,
ex parte)1 their application might be understandable. A policy
against disturbing the marriage status away from the husband,
even though he has been delinquent in the fulfilment of his ob-
ligations, might be considered desirable in many quarters. But no
such policy is fully subserved. The one exception in each case
is divorce. A wife, under each decision, is free to sue for di-
vorce in a domicile apart from her husband, but denied capacity
to secure any other domiciliary benefits away from him. If any
limitations are to be thrust around a deserted wife in the matter
of getting an independent domicile, it would be better to hold
that she would be free to gain it only in such cases as would not
affect her husband's marital rights. If such a rule were adopted
it would protect a husband, and at the same time would give his
wife some of the freedom, which she, because of his wrongful
conduct, is entitled to. Possibly protection should be afforded
such a husband, but it should be noted that it will be difficult to
safeguard him and his abandoned or deserted wife at the same
time.
II
It will sometimes happen that a wife will leave her husband
illegally and go to another state, where she will live with the
intention of staying, indefinitely. Under these circumstances one
would be tempted to hold that her domiciliary privileges should
be controlled by the law of her husband's domicile, and not by
that of her new home; yet that latter country according to ordi-
nary legal principles might logically be considered as her domi-
cile. Most courts, however, hold that such a wife is domiciled
10. It is customary to grant divorces at the domicile of one of the parties
upon constructive service. Such divorces, it would seem, are con-
ceded by the United States Supreme Court to be valid within the
jurisdiction where rendered in any event (Haddock v. Haddock)
(1905) 201 U. S. 562,569) and frequently the defendant is unable
to or does not defend.
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with her husband; that she being the delinquent party, is unable
to secure a domicile away from her husband." These authori-
ties, in reality, merely establish and enforce a policy against a
guilty wife being afforded any independent domiciliary rights,
and entrench themselves in their position behind the fiction of
the unity of person of a married couple. 12  Is such an at-
titude desirable, and if it is, must it be based on a fiction?
When all other means of reaching a preferable end fail,
setting up a fiction to accomplish this should be permissible. In
the absence, however, of -such an impelling cause, a fiction ought
not to be assumed, for there is always danger that the false as-
sumption will be regarded as a fact in other like situations ,when
uncalled for, and when it may lead to a wrong and unjust con-
clusion. 13 Naturally, there is sympathy in the assumed case for
the husband, and it can be asserted with some degree of justice
that his rights as the injured party should be protected, if pos-
sible. If the independent domiciliary rights, which his wife con-
tends for will disturb the marriage, or his marital rights in any
way contrary to the law of his domicile, she might well be pre-
cluded from insisting upon them.
To illustrate the above statements, let it be supposed that
the divorce law of a wife's new home is more liberal than. her
husband's; that there is no cause for divorce at his domicile,
11. Looker v. Gerald (1892) 157 Mass. 42, 31 N. E. 709; Re Bushbey
(1908) 112 N. Y. Supp. 262; Dutcher v. Dutcher (1876) 39 Wis. 651.
See contra Irby v. Wilson (1837) 21 N. C. 568; Re Walker (1907)
105 N. Y. Supp. 890; Saperstone v. Saperstone (1911) 131 N. Y. Supp.
241; Re Crosbey's Estate (1914) 148 N. Y. Supp. 1045; Prater v.
Prater (1888) 87 Tenn. 78. See also Ware v. Elory (1917) 199 Mo.
App. 60, 201 S. W. 593.
12. "Of course this is a pure fiction, and fiction always is a poor ground
for changing substantial right."- Per Holmes, J., dissenting in Had-
dock v. Haddock, supra, note 10, 201 U. S. I. c. 630. Sed qu?
13. For example, there is grave danger of the doctrine of estoppel by
deed to deny title being carried, in some jurisdictions, to the ex-
tent of blocking the title of a bona fide purchaser for value, and this
even when the deed raising the estoppel is out of the record chain of
title. See Tefft v. Munson (1875) 57 N. Y. 97.
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but there is at her new place of settlement. Many people might,
not without reason, consider it quite improper for her to ob-
tain a divorce in the state where she is on grounds not recognized
by his law. It might quite reasonably be asked, in view of the
wife's admitted duty to be with her husband and subject to his
law, why should another jurisdiction make her way easy as a
deserter, by freeing her from her husband? Again, assume that
the law of intestate succession at a wife's separate residence
gives her surviving husband less of her personal property than he
would have gotten under the law of his domicile (the jurisdic-
tion which the wife should also have been subject to). It might
plausibly be said in this case that it would be unjust to deny
to the husband such share of his deceased wife's property as he
would have received had she fulfilled her duties and remained
with him. It is not therefore surprising to find many courts
denying a wife the power to bring about these results, and ac-
complishing this in an easy and effective way by saying that she
is not domiciled where she is living, and this in spite of the truth
of the case. She is domiciled there because she has exercised
human powers of which no law can deprive her.'" Neverthe-
less, if we are able to conclusively assert and finally determine
that a guilty wife's domicile is with her husband, the state where
she is living will have no jurisdiction over her, and her husband's
interests will be fully protected. Is the fiction the only means of
accomplishing the end ? Is a disposition of this type of case pur-
suant to the fiction the one which the best policy demands ?15
Frequently domiciliary rights are afforded a party by a
positive statutory provision. Usually, if not invariably, divorce
law is statutory, and demands that a domiciled citizen shall be
allowed a divorce on the establishment of stated grounds. As a
14. See, supra, note 3 and text in connection therewith.
15. Jurisdiction has been based on a fiction before this. In the case of
transitory actions it was originally conclusively asserted that the
act complained of occurred within the realm. The defendant was
not permitted to deny this fact. See Marshall, C. J. in Livingston v.
Hall (1811) Fed. Cas No. 8,411, Vol. 15 p. 660, 663.
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rule also, a statute enacts that in the event of intestacy, a domi-
ciled citizen's personal property shall descend to certain desig-
nated persons in a manner specifically directed. 6  Now, if a
deserting wife is really domiciled apart from her husband, and
a statute such as described above is in force at her new home,
courts there will be compelled to grant her a divorce even on
grounds not recognized at her husband's domicile because the
statute so provides. So too, her courts would be compelled to
distribute her personalty according to their law, if she died intes-
tate, even at the expense of her surviving husband's rights under
the law of his domicile, the place where she likewise should.
have been domiciled at the time of her death. The matter of
policy in the assumed cases has been settled in favor of the wife
through the enactment of the statutes. In all cases similar to
those supposed, therefore, the courts of a wife's new settlement,
in order to prevent her affecting her husband's domiciliary priv-
ileges, must find that she is domiciled with him; this is essen-
tial to escape the statutory provisions. Of course, if such courts
,do s o decide, they will be "judicially repealing" the provisions of
a perfectly clear and unequivocal statute.
In cases where there are no statutory provisions, such as
those last assumed, perhaps a court at a wife's new home would
be free to deny her, when she has illegally left her husband,
rights in conflict with privileges afforded her husband by his
domiciliary law without saying that she was domiciled with him.
In such case, a wife's domiciliary court might say that it had a
choice of available law in the matter. It might hold that it
would not necessarily be bound to measure such a domiciled
wife's rights by the law it customarily applied to like cases, but
rather by some other law more appropriate to the particular
situation, i. e., the law best calculated to mete out justice in the
case at hand. If a court is able to choose its law in this way,
it could choose the law of a husband's domicile as best meeting
16. See, for example, sec. 1802 R. S. Mo. 1919 (divorce) and sec. 7787
Iowa Code 1919 (intestate succession).
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the needs of the case. No real objection is seen to following this
suggestion, if a court is not required by virtue of a statute to do
otherwise. After all, the law which a court ought to apply in a
given case is that best suited to the situation before it. But the
obstacle in the way of always carrying out this suggestion is the
one already mentioned, namely that often a court at a wife's
new domicile has no discretion, but is positively required by
statute to afford to her, as a domiciled citizen, certain expressly
mentioned privileges and immunities, which will affect her hus-
band. Accordingly, it can be said that only in a very limited
class of cases can courts of a guilty wife's separate home pro-
tect her husband according to his domiciliary law without invok-
ing the aid of the fiction of unity of person.
There is no difficulty in carrying out the policy against a
wife's state interfering with the rights of an innocent husband,
as recognized by his domiciliary law, so long as her jurisdiction
favors such a course. If the question is presented in such
courts they may deny any privileges inconsistent with her hus-
band's legitimate interests on one or the other of the theories
heretofore discussed. But what is there to make it certain
that, as a matter of conflict of laws, a wife's jurisdiction will be
so liberally disposed? Comity may lead a wife's state to do so,
but comity is merely international courtesy, and states are not
always courteous. It can be argued that from the very nature of
things and people, a wife can not be compelled to remain with her
husband; that she can establish herself elsewhere, and a state
whither she has removed is actually her sovereign; that if a
wife's jurisdiction denies her husband any rights inconsistent with
its law, it may be characterized as illiberal and selfish, but never-
theless it acts in so doing within its own legitimate power as an
independent government.17
17. Take the case of ancillary administration. As a rule the funds will
be remitted to the domicile of a decendent, but prior to this, the claims
of domestic creditors must be settled. Some jurisdictions even go
so far as to prefer their own creditors when the estate is insolvent.
See Wharton, Conflicts of Law, 3rd. ed. sec. 640. See also Lawrence
v. Kitteridge (1852) 21 Conn. 577.
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In the United States there is one way in which the above
contention may be met successfully and that is by holding, as a
matter of due process under the federal constitution, that a state
to which a wife, in violation of her duties to her husband, has re-
moved has not jurisdiction of domiciliary matters because she is
not domiciled there. This decision would be based on the same
fiction, that is that the wife is domiciled with her husband. It
is not proposed at this time to discuss in detail the constitutional
question, nor the extent to which a wife's state has been de-
nied jurisdiction under federal decisions, but obviously if such a
rule were adopted any adjudication by a wife's court could be
discredited with impunity by any other court if it were found
that the jurisdictional fact (i. e. the wife's being away from her
husband for cause) did not exist. Moreover, such fact could
always be inquired into by any other court, which might be asked
to recognize such a judgment.s On the other hand, it would fol-
low from this proposition just as easily that if a wife did have
cause to leave her husband that her place of residence would have
jurisdiction over domiciliary matters, and an adjudication by a
court of such state would be predicated upon due process and
would be entitled to full faith and credit in all others.',
If a husband's domiciliary court (he living apart from his
wife) adjudges that his wife is domiciled with him because of
her duty to be there, and otherwise duly proceeds to settle domi-
ciliary rights in a way in conflict with the law of his wife's place
of residence, such settlement might be accredited on grounds of
comity, but comity alone would not require its recognition.2 0
However, if the law of the federal constitution (which question
18. Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565; Haddock v.
Haddock (1906) 201 U. S. 562, 50 L. Ed. 867; Fisher v. Fieldiig
(1895) 67 Conn. 91, 34 Atl. 714.
19. Haddock v. Haddock, supra, note 18.
20. "And as a corollary of the recognized power of a government thus
to deal with its own citizens by a decree which would be operative
within its own borders, irrespective of any extra territorial efficacy,
it follows that the right of another sovereignty exists, under prin-
ciples of comity, to give to a decree so rendered such efficacy as to
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is not here discussed) should be that a wife is domiciled with
her husband when she is wrongfully away from him, then such
judgment would have to be accredited under the full faith and
credit provision of the constitution, if it was found as a matter of
fact that she was wrongfully away from him. The recognition
of the judgment would be compulsory.21 Conversely, if she was
at liberty to be away from him, unless the fiction of unity of
person of married people is to be pushed to an extreme point, the
judgment would not be based on proper domiciliary jurisdic-
tion, and would not have to be sanctioned by any other court.
Conceding that there is a policy against granting a guilty
wife privileges pursuant to an independent domiciliary law, to
what extent should it be pushed either as a matter of comity, or
as a matter of constitutional right? How far, for example,
would it be proper for federal constitutional law, proceeding on
a fiction, to go in denying jurisdiction in domiciliary matters to
a state where a wife is residing? How far should it go in in-
sisting that a decree of a husband's domicile affecting his default-
ing wife should be binding and effective? Does a proper policy
demand, for instance, that she shall be denied all rights, because
of lack of jurisdiction, even though their exercise will not in-
jure her husband in any possible way? A court could say that
a wife should be penalized to this extent, and that she should not
be aided in any degree in gaining rights which must be based
that government may seem to be justified by its conception of duties
and public policy." White, C. J. in Haddock v. Haddock, supra, note
19, 201 U. S. 1. c. 570.
21. "Where the domicile of a husband is in a particular state .
the courts of such state, having jurisdiction over the husband, may,
in virtue of the duty of the wife to be at the matrimonial domicile
disregard an unjustifiable absence therefrom, and treat the wife as
having her domicile in the state of the matrimonial domicile for
the purposes of the dissolution of the marriage, and as a result
have power to render a judgment dissolving the marriage which will
be binding upon both parties and entitled to recognition in all other
states ....... White, C. J., in Haddock v. Haddock, supra, note
18, 201 U. S. I. c. 571.
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on a violation of her duty. If a court's attitude were this strict,
the fiction should be applied in all events, and any judgment
rendered by courts of a wife's residence should be denied recog-
nition, and, as a matter of constitutional law, when questioned,
held to be lacking in due process. Under such rulings, the domi-
cile of her husband would have exclusive jurisdiction in all
matters of this nature, and its decrees would always have to be
accredited.
It is conceivable, however, that this policy need not be car-
ried to this extreme; that the jurisdictional fiction should be said
to exist only to protect a husband. If this is the case, then it
should be applied only where its repudiation will injure a hus-
band. Obviously this will result in a wife's being held to be
domiciled in two places (for different purposes, however) at
the same time. Why not? There is no reason why a wife
should not be said to be domiciled where she is for purposes of
voting (if a statute requires domicile as distinguished from resi-
dence), or for suing in the federal courts on grounds of diversity
of citizenship, and at the same moment of time with her hus-
band for purposes of divorce, or intestate succession. There
should be no requirement of rigid consistency in the application
of a fiction, especially when it is used to acquire jurisdiction.
In truth the very fact that it is a fiction ought to lead us to say
that it is an exception to the general rule.
III
The problem still remains of disposing of cases where the
parties are separated by agreement. Occasionally a husband and
wife agree to separate, and the wife pursuant to such agreement,
establishes herself in a state under such conditions as would
normally constitute it her domicile. It has been held that a wife,
pursuant to such an agreement., is unable to acquire a domicile
of her own, 22 but there are decisions that she may do so, and that
22. Warrender v. Warrender (1835) 2 C1. & Fin. 448, 6 Eng. Rep. 1239;
Jones v. Jones (1894) 30 N. Y. Supp. 177; McClellan v. Carroll
(1897) 42 S. W. 185 (Tenn.). See Comerford v. Coulter (1899) 82
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her domiciliary affairs will be governed by the law of the state,
to which she has gone.2"
Which way such a case should be decided is again a ques-
tion of policy. If separation agreements are to be discounte-
nanced then as a matter of comity a wife should be denied separ-
ate privileges and immunities, and the federal decisions under
the constitution could deny jurisdiction to a wife's domicile on
the same old fiction.. However, if there is no policy to be sub-
served by vitiating the agreement to this extent, all courts could
recognize the facts as they actually are, leaving the courts of a
wife's domicile free to regulate and order her domiciliary rights.
In this country such freedom could be assured by a federal de-
cision to the effect that a husband's domicile had no jurisdiction
over his wife, because she was domiciled elsewhere in further-
ance of the agreement.
IV
Finally, and at the risk of repetition, it is desired again to
suggest that the entire question of a married woman being ac-
corded a separate domicile with the usual legal consequences is
only a question of policy, and in the absence of any controlling
principle of constitutional law, agreement as to a proper policy
among the several states of the Union cannot be assured. There
is no way by which we can control the action of the courts of
the domicile of either party-short of such a ruling. If a wife's
residence, upon appropriate facts, chooses to assert that she is
domiciled there, and to rule her accordingly, unless the United
States Supreme Court decides that such decision is binding, her
husband's domicile is free to disregard the decision, and to settle
Mo. App. 362 and White v. Glover (1909) 116 N. Y. Supp. 1059
Compare Pate v. Pate (1878) 6 Mo. App. 49.
23. Smith v. Smith (1886) 19 Neb. 706 (dictum) ; Re Geiser's Will
(1913) 82 N. J. Eq. 311, 87 AtI. 628; Re Florance's Will (1889) 7
N. Y. Supp. 578; Colburn v. Holland (1868) 14 Rich. Eq. (S. C.)
176; Buchholz v. Buchholz (1911) 63 Wash. 213, 115 Pac. 88; see
Crosby's Estate (1914) 148 N. Y. Supp. 1045.
28 LAW SERIES 29, MISSOURI BULLETIN
the matter anew and differently. Conversely if a husband's
domiciliary court decides to hold that his wife is domiciled there,
his wife's domiciliary court may, with equal impunity, consider
the former court's adjudication of no effect.
Perhaps such a situation is the most desirable. Perhaps
each court ought to be free to handle the problem in this way.
But if we do not consider this a proper condition of affairs, the
United States Supreme 'Court appears to be free to make its
mind up as what is the proper policy, and to compel recogni-
tion of a judgment in any case where it believes that a wife
should be subject to her husband's domiciliary jurisdiction by in-
voking a fiction. The fiction also will effect her inability to
submit herself to the jurisdiction of any other state or court.
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